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Abstract:  
This paper clarifies the role of initial asset value constraints in Ramsey models of 
incomplete factor taxation. We show that the optimal long-run capital tax is zero in the 
long run if and only if there is no binding constraint on the initial capital tax rate. This 
finding contrasts with Armenter (2008) who argues that zero long-run capital taxes 
reappear in models of incomplete factor taxation as long as the government is barred 
from manipulating initial asset wealth. The reason for this difference is that the two 
constraints cannot both be binding at the same time. Hence, in Armenter’s (2008) 
analysis, the initial asset value constraint is necessarily more restrictive than the 
constraint on the initial capital tax rate. 
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1 Introduction
One of the most provocative results in the Ramsey taxation literature is that capital income should
not be taxed in the long-run. This conclusion, rst established by Chamley (1986) and Judd
(1985), is surprisingly robust to a wide variety of assumptions about the economic environment.1
As Correia (1996) and Jones et al. (1997) show, however, the Chamley-Judd result hinges on the
condition that the government can freely tax every factor of production. If instead the tax system
is incomplete, the long-run capital tax rate is generally di¤erent from zero.
In a recent paper, Armenter (2008) argues that the non-zero capital tax result of Correia
(1996) and Jones et al. (1997) crucially depends on how scal policy is constrained at date t =
0. Armenters starting point is the observation that the revenue ows from an untaxed factor
contribute to the initial asset value of the economy. As long as marginal productivity of the
untaxed factor is a¤ected by the economys capital stock, the long-run capital tax can thus be
used to depress the initial asset value indirectly through its distorting role on capital accumulation.
Under the standard assumption that the initial capital tax rate is restricted, this indirect e¤ect
on the initial asset value is what generates the non-zero capital tax result of Correia (1996) and
Jones et al. (1997). If instead, the government is barred from manipulating initial asset wealth, the
original Chamley-Judd result reappears. Based on this insight, Armenter (2008) concludes that the
non-zero capital tax prescription in models of incomplete factor taxation should be considered with
caution because a constraint on initial asset wealth is a priori no more restrictive than a constraint
on the initial capital tax rate.
In this paper, we consider a more general denition of the Ramsey equilibrium that simul-
taneously imposes the restriction on the initial capital tax rate and the restriction on the initial
asset value as inequality constraints (i.e., the initial capital tax rate cannot exceed some value ^0
while initial asset wealth cannot be smaller than some value A^0). We show how to implement this
equilibrium and, in doing so, we are able to clarify the role of initial asset value constraints. These
clarications are important because the Ramsey taxation approach has recently been applied to
richer environments with market imperfections that, from a mechanical point of view, contribute
to initial asset wealth in very similar ways as in the setup considered in Armenter (2008).2
First, we show that capital taxes are zero in the long run if and only if the constraint on the
initial capital tax rate is non-binding. Hence, Armenter (2008) is correct in arguing that the long-
run capital tax rate in models of incomplete factor taxation crucially depends on how scal policy
is constrained at date t = 0. But his reinstatement of the Chamley-Judd result has nothing to do
1See Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) for a comprehensive review.
2Some examples of this second generation" of Ramsey models are Guo and Lansing (1999), Domeij (2005),
Arseneau and Chugh (2008), Aruoba and Chugh (2008), and Arseneau, Chugh, and Kurmann (2008).
2
per se with the assumption that tax rates have to imply some exogenously imposed initial asset
value A^0. Rather, the result obtains because there is no binding constraint on the initial capital
tax rate.
Indeed, it is well known in the Ramsey literature that whenever possible, the government should
raise all revenues through taxes on initial capital. Given the pre-determined nature of the initial
capital stock, this is akin to a lump-sum tax. Consequently, all distortionary taxes are zero 
including the long-run capital tax rate and the economy attains its rst best. This leads to the
second clarication of the paper. We show that the initial capital tax constraint and the initial asset
value constraint cannot both be binding at the same time. Hence, Armenters (2008) constraint
that the government is barred from manipulating initial asset wealth is necessarily more restrictive
than the constraint on the initial capital tax rate. More generally, Armenter (2008) argues that a
restriction on initial asset wealth is no more arbitrary than a constraint on the initial capital tax
rate. This argument seems hard to follow. Restricting the initial capital tax rate can be justied
on grounds of implementability constraints and political economy considerations.3 The Ramsey
problem then consists of setting equilibrium allocations such as to maximize welfare. Imposing
instead an exogenous constraint on the initial asset value defeats the normative purpose of Ramsey
taxation. It amounts to simply assuming that the equilibrium is suboptimal in much the same way
as if we asserted that the government has to implement a pre-ordained present value of consumption
to the private sector.
Both clarications o¤ered in this paper are the result of our general denition of the Ramsey
equilibrium. By contrast, Armenter (2008) implements the Ramsey equilibrium under which the
government is barred from manipulating initial asset wealth simply by treating initial asset wealth
as a constant. This e¤ectively assumes away the inuence of both future capital stocks and the
initial capital tax rate on initial asset wealth. While the resulting solution for the optimal long-
run capital tax rate remains correct, it is for the wrong reasons. According to Armenters (2008)
implementation, it is because capital taxes do not a¤ect initial asset wealth whereas in our analysis,
it is because the e¤ect of capital taxes on initial asset wealth is exactly o¤set by an inverse e¤ect
on the governments implementability constraint. It is therefore impossible to see from Armenters
(2008) analysis that the two constraints cannot both be binding at the same time and that in
cases where the initial asset value constraint is binding, it is necessarily more restrictive than the
constraint on the initial capital tax rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey describes Armenters
3For example, if agents have the option to hold capital at some storage cost rather than renting it to rms,
the initial tax rate is bounded for there to be an equilibrium (see Atkeson et al., 1999). Alternatively, consider a
decentralized economy with nancial frictions that constrain rmsnancing. For su¢ ciently high initial tax rates,
these constraints could be so important that rms can no longer invest and thus, the economy shuts down.
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stylized economy that we reuse here one for one for the sake of comparison. Section 3 denes the
Ramsey equilibrium and solves for the more general case that imposes both constraints simultane-
ously. Section 4 compares our results with Armenter (2008) and concludes.
2 The Economy
The economic environment and notation is the same as in Armenter (2008), so our description is
kept brief. There are three agents in the economy: a representative rm, a representative household,
and a government.
The representative rm purchases capital kt, labor nt and an unnamed factor zt on competitive
markets and uses them as inputs in a constant returns to scale production technology
yt = f(kt; nt; zt): (1)
Output yt is sold to households in a perfectly competitive market.
Households, in turn, discount the future at rate  2 (0; 1), have preferences over consumption
and leisure u (ct; 1  nt) and own all factors of production. Capital evolves according to
kt+1 = (1  )kt + it
where it denotes investment and 0 <  < 1 is the rate of depreciation. Labor is non-negative and
the total time endowment per period is normalized to one. Leisure is thus 1   nt. The factor zt
is not storable and is in xed supply, i.e. zt = z 8t. Households own shares st of this factor, each
of which represents a claim to a stream of dividends fdvg1v=t. This claim is valued at ex-dividend
price pt.
The government, nally, has to nance an exogenous stream of government expenditures fgtg1t=0
with at-rate taxes  t and t on labor income wtnt and capital income rtkt, where wt is the wage
rate and rt is the capital rental rate. Furthermore, the government can smooth tax revenues by
issuing a one-period bond bgt at price qt. However, the government cannot tax income from the
unnamed factor zt. The governments ow budget constraint is thus
gt + b
g
t =  twtnt + trtkt + qtb
g
t+1 (2)
Given these denitions, the representative households problem is
max
fct;nt;kt+1;st+1;bt+1g1t=0
1X
t=0
tu (ct; 1  nt) (3)
subject to the ow budget constraint
ct + qtbt+1 + kt+1   (1  )kt + pt (st+1   st)  (1   t)wtnt + (1  t) rtkt + dtst + bt: (4)
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2.1 Competitive Equilibrium
The households optimality conditions are
qt =
uc;t+1
uc;t
(5)
1 =
uc;t+1
uc;t
((1  t+1)rt+1 + 1  ) (6)
 un;t
uc;t
= (1   t)wt (7)
pt =
uc;t+1
uc;t
(pt+1 + dt+1) : (8)
The rms optimality conditions with respect to factor inputs are
rt = Fk(kt; nt; zt) (9)
wt = Fn(kt; nt; zt) (10)
dt = Fz(kt; nt; zt): (11)
The market-clearing conditions for bonds and claims to the untaxed factor are
bt = b
g
t (12)
st = 1: (13)
Finally, the aggregate resource constraint is
ct + kt+1   (1  )kt + gt  F (kt; nt; zt): (14)
Taken together, conditions (5)-(14) characterize the equilibrium quantities and prices
fct; nt; kt+1; pt; qt; wt; rt; dt; bt; stg1t=0 for given fgt;  t; tg1t=0.
It is worth drawing attention to the fact that conditions (5), (6), and (8) together imply an
arbitrage condition between the after-tax returns on holding a unit of physical capital and a claim
to the untaxed factor, zt, that must hold for all t,
1
qt
= ((1  t+1)rt+1 + 1  ) = pt+1 + dt+1
pt
: (15)
This arbitrage condition links the capital tax rate directly to the equilibrium return on a claim
to the untaxed factor. We can also express the date t = 0 asset price as a standard present-value
condition. To see this, note that the period-zero pricing condition (8) can be expressed as
p0 =
1X
t=1
qtdt =
1X
t=1
t
uc;t
uc;0
dt =
1X
t=1
t
uc;t
uc;0
Fz(kt; nt); (16)
where qt  q1:::qt.4
4To simplify notation, we write Fz(kt; nt) instead of Fz(kt; nt; zt) from here on since zt = z in equilibrium.
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3 Ramsey equilibrium
The Ramsey governments problem is to nance the exogenous stream of government expenditures
by choosing the sequence of labor income and capital income tax rates f t; tg1t=0 that achieves
the highest possible household welfare among the feasible competitive equilibrium allocations. As
is customary in the Ramsey taxation literature, we assume full commitment on the part of the
government.
The goal is to implement a general Ramsey equilibrium that imposes inequality constraints on
both the initial capital tax rate and the initial asset value of the economy. We begin by setting up
the core Ramsey problem with neither of these restrictions. We then add the two constraints and
solve for the di¤erent possible solutions. For the sake of comparability with Armenter (2008) and
the literature in general, we adopt the usual primal approach to solve the problem. It is important
to point out, however, that all results go through for the dual approach initially employed by
Chamley (1986).
3.1 The core Ramsey problem
The primal approach consists of using the private-sector equilibrium conditions to eliminate prices
and tax rates from the Ramsey problem, and then suppose that the government directly chooses
quantities among the feasible set of competitive equilibrium allocations. To do so, we construct the
implementability constraint (IC) of the economy by substituting the di¤erent optimality conditions
of the private equilibrium into the present-value version of the household budget constraint in (4).
The details of this derivation can be found in Armenter (2008). Given the IC, the Ramsey problem
can be formulated as follows.
Proposition 1. A Ramsey equilibrium is an allocation fct; nt; kt+1g1t=0 and an initial capital in-
come tax rate 0 that solves
max
1X
t=0
tu (ct; 1  nt)
subject to
1X
t=0
t (uc;tct + un;tnt)  uc;0 [b0 + (p0 + d0) + ((1  0)Fk;0 + 1  ) k0]  A0 (17)
and
F (kt; nt; zt)  ct + kt+1   (1  )kt + gt (18)
at all dates t  0, taking the initial values k0; b0 and the sequence fgtg1t=0 as given.
Proof. See Armenter (2008).
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Two points are important to highlight about this description of the Ramsey equilibrium. First,
our formulation of the IC in (17) directly incorporates the sequence of no-arbitrage conditions (15).
Imposing such a sequence of constraints for investment in physical capital is part of the standard
construction of the IC but, obviously, the same sequence of constraints can also be imposed for
investment in shares of the untaxed factor zt.
Second, the term A0 in (17) is dened as initial asset wealth or the initial asset value of the
economy. We emphasize that this asset value is not predetermined (as k0 or b0 are) but is actually a
function of all allocations dated t = 0:::1. This is because A0 contains p0, and in turn p0 depends, as
shown by (16), on the entire sequence of allocations dated t = 0:::1. To emphasize this dependence
of A0 on allocations beyond date t = 0, we write from here on A0 (fct; nt; ktg1t=0 ; 0), or A0(:) for
short. This point is crucial as it implies that A0(:) can never be taken as a constant when solving
for the Ramsey equilibrium, even if A0(:) is constrained to satisfy a certain numerical value in
equilibrium.5
3.2 Constraints on initial period taxes and initial asset wealth
The core Ramsey problem abstracts from restrictions on taxation except that the governments only
tax instruments are at-rate taxes on capital and labor income. We now impose two additional
constraints:
1. Initial capital tax constraint. The initial capital tax rate is restricted to 0  ^0, where
^0 is an arbitrary constant.
2. Initial asset value constraint. The initial asset value is restricted toA0 (fct; nt; ktg1t=0 ; 0) 
A^0, where A^0 is an arbitrary constant.
The rst constraint is standard in the Ramsey literature and is imposed, as we will revisit,
to avoid that the government can nance the entire sequence of government expenditures via a
lump-sum tax on initial capital. If one were to entertain only this rst constraint, a Ramsey
equilibrium similar to the ones in Correia (1996) and Jones et al. (1997) would emerge provided
that ^0 is su¢ ciently small. If instead one were to entertain only the second type of constraint 
and in particular treat it as a strict equality constraint  Armenters (2008) alternative Ramsey
equilibrium concept in which the government is barred from manipulating initial asset wealth would
emerge. Here, we impose both constraints simultaneously as inequality constraints.
5To elaborate a bit further on this, we note that Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, p. 492) emphasize that in
Ramsey models of complete factor taxation, the analogous constant term A0" is properly expressed as the function
A0(c0; n0; 0), hence it depends directly only on period-zero allocations. With incomplete factor taxation, however,
because of the dependence of A0(:) on period t > 0 allocations through (16), as just described in the text, the function
A0(:) depends on more than just period-zero allocations.
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To solve for the thus constrained Ramsey problem, we simplify notation as in Armenter (2008)
and dene
V (ct; nt)  uc;tct + un;tnt
H(ct; nt; kt)  uc;tFz(kt; nt):
The Lagrangian for the governments optimization problem then becomes
L =
1X
t=0
t [u(ct; 1  nt) + t(F (kt; nt) + (1  )kt   kt+1   ct   gt)] (19)
+ 
( 1X
t=0
t[V (ct; nt) H(ct; nt; kt)]  uc;0 [b0 + ((1  0)Fk;0 + 1  ) k0]
)
+ 
n
^0   0
o
+ 
( 1X
t=0
tH(ct; nt; kt) + uc;0 [b0 + ((1  0)Fk;0 + 1  ) k0]  A^0
)
;
in which t, , , and  are the respective Lagrange multipliers. The rst two lines of the La-
grangian capture the core Ramsey problem stated in Proposition 1. The third line is the constraint
on the initial capital tax rate. The fourth line is the constraint on initial asset wealth. SinceP1
t=0 
tH(ct; nt; kt) = uc;0(p0 + d0) (from the denitions above), this constraint could equivalently
be expressed as A0 (fct; nt; ktg1t=0 ; 0)  A^0  0. The constraint on initial asset wealth is thus more
complicated than the constraint on the initial capital tax rate because it does not apply to a single
variable, but rather to the entire sequence of equilibrium allocations fct; nt; kt+1g1t=0 plus the initial
capital tax rate 0.
3.3 Long-run capital taxation
With the setup of the problem claried, we analyze the optimal long-run capital income tax. The
relevant FOCs are the ones with respect to 0 and kt+1
 = (  )uc;0Fk;0k0 (20)
t = [t+1(Fk;t+1 + 1  ) + (  )Hk;t+1]: (21)
Condition (20) states that the marginal benet  from increasing the initial capital tax rate 0 equals
the net gain from reducing the initial asset value by uc;0Fk;0k0. On the one hand, the increase in
0 relaxes the IC because the government needs to raise less revenue through distortionary taxes,
thus bringing the economy closer to its rst-best solution. This increases the Ramsey planners
objective by uc;0Fk;0k0. On the other hand, the increase in 0 decreases the initial asset value of
the economy, which diminishes the Ramsey planners objective by uc;0Fk;0k0.
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Condition (21), in turn, states that the Ramsey planners marginal cost from investment today
is equal to the discounted marginal gain from the increase in net capital return (Fk;t+1+1  ) plus
the net gain from the change in asset wealth (  )Hk;t+1 that this investment entails tomorrow.
Under the usual assumption that the Ramsey allocation converges to a stationary equilibrium
as t!1, this second condition rewritten in steady state becomes
1 = 

(Fk + 1  ) +   

Hk

: (22)
Comparing this condition to the steady state version of the competitive equilibrium condition for
investment in (6),
1 =  [(1  1)Fk + 1  ] ; (23)
it is clear that the long-run capital income tax rate 1 is zero if either Hk = 0 or  = . Consider
the rst condition: Hk = ucFzk = 0 if and only if the untaxed factor z and capital k are strictly
separable inputs in the production function. This point is clear from Armenter (2008), Correia
(1996), and Jones et al. (1997). So from here on we assume Hk 6= 0 to make the problem
interesting, just as in the related literature.
Now consider the second condition:  =  implies that the the marginal gain from relaxing the
IC (i.e. decreasing the distortions from at-rate taxation) equals the marginal loss from increasing
the initial asset value constraint. Under this condition, 1 = 0 even if Hk 6= 0. However, the
following proposition shows that this condition is satised only for a very particular case.
Proposition 2. Provided that Hk 6= 0, the optimal long-run capital income tax rate is zero 1 = 0
if and only if fgtg1t=0 and ^0 are such that 0 < ^0 in the Ramsey equilibrium.
Proof. Consider two di¤erent Ramsey equilibria: one in which the constraint on the initial capital
tax binds and one in which it does not. If the constraint on the initial capital tax binds (i.e.
0 = ^0), then  > 0 by Kuhn-Tucker.6 Since uc;0Fk;0k0 in (20) is strictly positive, it therefore has
to be that  6= . But then, comparison of (22) and (23) implies 1 6= 0. If instead the constraint
on the initial capital tax does not bind (i.e. 0 < ^0), then  = 0 and by (20), we have  = ,
which in turn implies 1 = 0.7 This proves that 1 can only be zero if and only if fgtg1t=0 and ^0
are such that 0 < ^0 in the Ramsey equilibrium.
6More precisely, the Kuhn-Tucker theorem states that at an optimum, we have (0   ^0) = 0. If 0 = ^0, then
  0. But we can discard the case  = 0 because it only applies if the problem is subject to another constraint
that needs to be relaxed simultaneously with 0 = ^0 in order to increase the objective. In our problem, there is no
such additional constraint; i.e. allowing the government to shift from distortionary taxes to lump-sum taxes on initial
capital income is always welfare-improving. Note also that the constraint qualication necessary for the Kuhn-Tucker
theorem to hold is always satised for our problem.
7Alternatively, we can show that for preferences consistent with balanced growth of the form
u(c; 1  n) = [c(1  n)  ]1 =(1  ),
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At rst sight, Proposition 2 may seem evident since in the standard incomplete factor taxation
problem without inital asset value constraints, it is well known that 1 = 0 if and only if there is
no binding constraint on the initial capital tax rate. In this case, the Ramsey planner nances all
of fgtg1t=0 with non-distortionary taxes on initial capital income 0Fkn0k0 and the economy attains
the rst best equilibrium. In other words, 1 = 0 if and only if ^0 is such that FB0  ^0 where
FB0 is the initial capital tax rate associated with the rst best equilibrium. The implications of
Proposition 2 for our generalized case with initial asset value constraints are more subtle, however,
as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 3. The initial capital tax constraint 0  ^0 and the initial asset value constraint
A0(:)  A^0 are mutually exclusive; i.e. except for non-generic parameter values, the two constraints
cannot bind simultaneously in a Ramsey equilibrium. If the initial asset value constraint binds (i.e.
A0(:) = A^0), then 1 = 0 even though the Ramsey equilibrium is generally not at its rst best.
Proof. For the rst part of the proposition, suppose we are in a Ramsey equilibrium where the
initial asset value constraint binds; i.e. A0 = A^0: By the above denition of A0(:), this implies the
following value for the initial capital tax rate
0 = 1 
0@ A^0 P1t=0 tH(ct;nt;kt)uc;0   b0
k0
  (1  )
1A =Fk0,
where the sequence fct; nt; kt+1g1t=0 implements the Ramsey equilibrium. Except for non-generic
parameter values, this value of 0 is necessarily higher or lower than the imposed upper bound ^0. If
0 > ^0 then the supposed Ramsey equilibrium cannot exist. If 0 < ^0 then the initial capital tax
constraint does not bind. An analogous argument proves that if the initial capital tax constraint
binds; i.e. 0(:) = ^0, then the initial asset value A0 associated with this Ramsey equilibrium is
necessarily higher or lower than the imposed lower bound A^0.
For the second part of the proposition, if we are in a Ramsey equilibrium where A0 = A^0, then
we necessarily have that 0 < ^0 as just demonstrated. But by Proposition 2, this implies 1 = 0.
Furthermore, by the same arguments than used above, the initial capital tax rate 0 implied by this
Ramsey equilibrium is either higher or lower than FB0 , the intial capital tax rate associated with
the condition  =  (i.e. 1 = 0) implies that it is optimal for the Ramsey planner to set all distortionary taxes to
zero and nance government expenditures exclusively with lump-sum taxes on initial capital income. Of course, this
is only possible if there is no binding constraint on 0, which is just another way of stating that  = 0. The strategy
of this alternative proof is similar to a strategy used by Atkeson et al. (1999) and is available from the authors upon
request.
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the rst best. Hence, the Ramsey planner must resort to some distortionary taxes (while keeping
1 = 0) to attain the equilibrium where A0 = A^0, which is necessarily suboptimal.8
To summarize, Proposition 3 reveals two of the main implications of our generalized treatment
of Ramsey equilibria with inequality constraints on both the initial capital tax and initial asset
wealth. First, for su¢ ciently large values of A^0 such that the initial asset value constraint binds,
we have 1 = 0 even though the resulting Ramsey equilibrium is not at its rst best. Second, in
an equilibrium where A0 = A^0, it necessarily has to be the case that the the initial asset value
constraint is more restrictive from a welfare point of view than the initial capital tax constraint.
This is important for our discussion of Armenter (2008) in what follows.
4 Discussion of Armenter (2008) and conclusion
The preceeding analysis allows us to bring about several clarications of Armenters (2008) recent
note on incomplete factor taxation. Using the model described in Section 2, Armenter (2008) rst
illustrates that the non-zero capital tax result of Correia (1996) and Jones et al. (1997) stems
from the possibility of taxing initial asset wealth by distorting capital accumulaton in the long-
run. Armenter (2008) then considers an alternative equilibrium without any constraint on initial
capital taxes but where the government is restricted from manipulating initial asset wealth (i.e.
the initial asset value constraint binds with equality). In this case, the Chamley-Judd result of
zero long-run capital taxation reappears. Armenter (2008) thus concludes that the non-zero capital
tax prescription in models of incomplete factor taxation should be considered with caution because
"...a constraint on the initial asset value is not necessarily more restrictive than a constraint on
the initial capital tax rate" (page 2276).
We certainly agree with Armenters (2008) rst point that optimal long-run capital taxes in
models of incomplete factor taxation are non-zero because such a tax can a¤ect initial asset wealth.
This insight is particularly useful for recent applications of the Ramsey taxation approach to models
with market imperfections (see references in the introduction). These imperfections give rise to rents
that contribute to the initial asset wealth of the economy much in the same way than dividends
from the untaxed factor zt do in the present model.
8An alternative proof of this last part goes as follows. Consider a Ramsey equilibrium where the initial capital
tax rate binds; i.e. 0 = ^0. Now, suppose this constraint is gradually relaxed. The Ramsey planner would obviously
take advantage of this loosening of constraints by increasing 0 so as to decrease distortionary taxes. The associated
change of allocations decreases the initial asset value A0. As the Ramsey planner continues this substitution of
distortionary taxes with 0, the economy either attains its rst best or A0 hits the imposed lower bound A^0. In the
latter case, it necessarily has to be true that 0 < FB0 .
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However, we nd less interest in Armenters (2008) reinstatement of the Chamley-Judd result
when initial asset wealth is restricted to a xed constant. First, our analysis shows that the
optimal long-run capital income tax rate in models of incomplete factor taxation is zero in only
two cases: either capital and the untaxed factor are strictly separable in the production function
(i.e. Hk = 0); or the Ramsey planner has unconstrained access to lump-sum taxes on initial capital
income (i.e. the constraint 0  ^0 does not bind). Hence, Armenters (2008) reinstatement of the
Chamley-Judd result has nothing do per se with the assumption that tax rates have to imply some
exogenously imposed initial asset wealth A^0. Rather, the result obtains because there is no binding
constraint on the initial capital tax rate.
Second and as shown by Proposition 3, imposing A0(:) = A^0 implies that the initial asset value
constraint is necessarily more restrictive than any (inequality) constraint on the initial capital
tax rate because the two constraints cannot both be binding. This contrasts with Armenters
(2008) conclusion. More generally, A0(:) = A^0 restricts the economy from attaining its rst best
not because of a restriction on the available tax instruments (i.e. a binding limit to lump-sum
taxation as is assumed in the standard Ramsey equilibrium) but simply because of a restriction
that the equilibrium be suboptimal. Or put another way, the equality constraint A0(:) = A^0
makes 0 endogenous, but endogenous in a non-optimizing way. A Ramsey government that were
to optimally choose the period-zero capital tax rate would with probability one not choose that
particular tax rate. This seems to defeat the normative purpose of Ramsey taxation models and is
more or less on the same level than, say, an ad-hoc constraint that consumption be no larger than
a certain value even if that is suboptimal. By contrast and whatever other criticisms one may levy
against the standard Ramsey equilibrium concept, the typical exogeneity assumption regarding the
initial capital tax rate can at least be justied on grounds of implementability constraints (see
footnote 3 in introduction).
Neither of the two clarications made in this paper come out of Armenters (2008) analysis. The
reason is that Armenter (2008) implements the Ramsey equilibrium under which the government
is barred from manipulating initial asset wealth by simply combining the IC with A0(:) = A^0. The
IC thus becomes
P1
t=0 
tV (ct; nt)  A^0, which e¤ectively assumes away the inuence of future
capital stocks or the initial capital tax rate on initial asset wealth. This simplication is correct
under the assumption that the Ramsey planner is free to choose 0 such that A0(:) = A^0 is always
satised. The problem is that this assumption is only made implicitly. As a result, the optimality
conditions resulting from Armenters (2008) implementation are equivalent to the ones obtained
under the assumption of Hk = 0. But this means that the Chamley-Judd result would obtain even
if there was a binding constraint on 0, which is clearly incorrect. By the same token, Armenters
(2008) implementation does not reveal that the initial asset value constraint cannot be binding
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simultaneously with the initial capital tax constraint. It is therefore impossible to see that when
the initial asset value constraint is binding, it is necessarily more restrictive than a constraint on
the initial capital tax rate.
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